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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the role of competition in productivity performance in Britain over the 
period from the late-nineteenth to the early twenty-first century.  A detailed review of the 
evidence suggests that the weakness of competition from the 1930s to the 1970s 
undermined productivity growth but since the 1970s stronger competition has been a key 
ingredient in ending relative economic decline.  The productivity implications of the retreat 
from competition resulted in large part from interactions with idiosyncratic British 
institutional structures in terms of corporate governance and industrial relations.  This 
account extends familiar insights from cliometrics both analytically and chronologically. 
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This paper is developed from a plenary lecture given to the Economic History Society 
Conference, University of Warwick, 2009 and from the Ellen MacArthur Lectures, University 
of Cambridge, 2009.  I am grateful to the audiences for helpful comments.  I have also 
benefited from helpful advice from Steve Broadberry and Mike Waterson.  Mary O’Mahony 
kindly made available to me some unpublished productivity estimates.  The usual disclaimer 
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1. Introduction 
For a century or more through the 1970s, Britain experienced relative economic decline.  In 
terms of real GDP per head, other countries caught up and then overtook Britain.  That is 
well-known to economic historians.  Perhaps less widely recognized is that in the late 
twentieth century Britain recovered so that by 2007, on the eve of the crisis, real GDP per 
head was just above French and West German levels.  Table 1 summarizes these trends and 
shows the 1950s through the 1970s as the period when British relative economic 
performance relative to its European peer group was weakest. 
This paper seeks to highlight the role that competition in product markets, or the lack of it, 
played in British relative economic decline by providing a perspective over the long 
twentieth century from the 1890s to the early 2000s.  This is not to suggest that competition 
was the only or necessarily the most important explanation but to propose that focusing on 
competition is to draw attention to an aspect of the British economy that deserves more 
prominence in the economic history literature, in particular because it interacts with 
corporate governance and industrial relations in producing productivity outcomes. 
Understanding this not only provides coherence to what otherwise seem unconnected or 
even irrational explanations for British relative decline but also is central to an account of 
British economic growth performance over time that takes history seriously. 
The importance of competition as an antidote to bad business management was given 
considerable prominence by new economic historians in the famous debate about the 
alleged failure of the British economy prior to World War I (McCloskey and Sandberg, 1971).  
But cliometricians have not really followed up the implications of the flipside of this insight 
with regard to the subsequent performance of the British economy in periods characterized 
by weaker competition.  It is timely to do so because growth economics both in terms of 
theory (Aghion and Howitt, 2006) and applied research by influential organizations such as 
OECD (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2005) has come to see as competition as a serious driver of 
better productivity outcomes, in particular through the incentive structures that face firms. 
In the rest of this paper, after reviewing some recent work in economics on competition and 
productivity performance, I shall develop the argument that the weakness of competition in 
product markets in the British economy from the 1930s to the 1970s was fundamental to 
British relative economic decline.  This period will be contrasted both with what went 
before and with what came after in order to provide a new long-run perspective on British 
relative economic performance. 
2.  Competition and productivity performance 
Economic theory gives somewhat ambiguous messages about the impact of competition on 
productivity performance.  A common and powerful line of argument is that competition is 
an effective antidote to principal-agent problems within firms that involve managers whose 
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interested are imperfectly aligned with owners failing to minimize costs with adverse effects 
on productivity. In this context, weak shareholders who face free-rider problems in 
monitoring management find competition helpful in devising contracts that incentivize 
mangers appropriately while competition also raises the sensitivity of profits to managerial 
actions (Nickell, 1996). Alternatively, product market competition reduces slack and acts as 
a disciplinary device fostering the adoption of new technology.  In an endogenous growth 
framework this can have productivity growth rate rather than just level effects (Aghion et 
al., 1997).  It is, however, possible to devise models in which an intensification of product 
market competition leads to a reduction of managerial effort (Scharfstein, 1988; Martin, 
1993). Ultimately, this is an empirical issue. 
The same remark applies to the impact of competition on innovation. Here, the classic so-
called ‘Schumpeterian’ argument was that ex-ante market power encourages innovation 
because it enhances the expected appropriability of profits. Against this is the ‘Hicksian’ 
possibility that market power allows management to be sleepy and the point that firms gain 
more from innovating in an industry which is competitive ex-ante if profits are perfectly 
appropriable ex-post (Fellner, 1951).  A combination of the Hicksian and Schumpeterian 
positions might suggest that the relationship between market power and innovation has an 
inverted-U shape.  Recently, a sophisticated variant of these arguments has proposed that 
entry threats encourage innovation by firms close to the technological frontier who can 
protect their rents but discourage innovation by firms far from the frontier who will 
succumb to entry whether or not they innovate (Aghion and Howitt, 2006).  This proposition 
generates the prediction that competition policy, especially de-regulation of entry, is 
increasingly good for growth as countries become more advanced. 
Product-market competition also has implications for productivity outcomes through 
industrial relations.  The existence of supernormal profits is the basis on which trade unions 
can promise rewards for membership (Brown, 2008). The profits resulting from market 
power are typically shared with workers depending on bargaining power (Blanchflower et 
al., 1996).  But workers may also bargain for lower work effort (overstaffing) when there are 
rents available to be shared.  If this is the form that bargaining takes, then it is 
straightforward to produce models which predict that increased competition will improve 
productivity performance (Haskel, 1991; Machin and Wadhwani, 1989). 
Even if theoretical predictions are ambiguous, the empirical evidence is clear that there is a 
strong positive relationship between competition and productivity performance, in 
particular because agency problems are mitigated.  Competition improved productivity 
performance in both British and German firms in the 1990s (Koke and Renneboog, 2005), 
tighter regulation that reduced entry in European markets raised mark-ups and lowered 
labour productivity growth (Cincera and Galgau, 2005), and good competition policy has had 
a strong impact on TFP growth in OECD countries (Buccirossi et al., 2009).  Turning 
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specifically to principal-agent problems, competition promotes good management practices 
which in turn pay off in improved productivity outcomes (Bloom and van Reenen, 2007). 
 With regard to innovation, a recent survey of the evidence concluded that, on balance, it 
points to a positive effect of competition; this was reinforced by the authors’ own research 
which showed that the European Single Market Programme had raised competition and 
that, in turn, this had increased R and D investments (Griffith et al., 2006).  There is evidence 
for the UK of an inverted U shape in the relationship between market power and patenting 
but the peak is at a low price-cost margin (Aghion et al., 2005).  Foreign-firm entry in the UK 
following liberalization has resulted in increased patenting and productivity growth but only 
in industries close to the technology frontier (Aghion, Blundell et al., 2009a). More generally 
across countries, reducing regulation that inhibits competition has positive (negative) 
effects on TFP growth in close to (far from) the frontier countries (Aghion, Ashkenazy et al., 
2009). 
The evidence on the relationship between product market competition and industrial 
relations outcomes in Britain is also quite well established.  Stewart (1990) found that mean 
union pay differentials were 8 to 10% in industries where there was market power but zero 
with competition.  Metcalf (2002) found that union bargaining reduced labour productivity 
significantly in industries with limited competition but had no effect otherwise. 
Overall, this review of the evidence indicates that we might expect that weak competition 
would have adverse effects on British productivity performance.  This would be more likely 
to be serious if firms were exposed to principal-agent problems arising in the control of 
managers by shareholders and/or if trade unions were in a strong position to bargain for 
low effort levels. 
3. Before 1914 
The performance of the British economy in the decades before World War I was a cause 
celebre for the new economic history in the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Writers in this 
tradition attacked widespread claims of entrepreneurial failure, most notably from Landes 
(1969), in particular by investigating the choice of technology from a profit-maximizing 
perspective, and generally found that the decisions were rational (Magee, 2004).  The most 
bullish assessment came from McCloskey who saw “a picture of an economy not stagnating 
but growing as rapidly as permitted by the growth of its resources and the effective 
exploitation of the available technology” (1970, p. 459). 
A clear implication of this debate was that international comparisons of productivity were 
the ultimate performance test.  In this respect, the evidence base is now much improved.  
The estimates in Table 2 show that in terms of whole-economy TFP the UK was still ahead of 
its main rivals in 1911.  In industry, the picture was less favourable with the USA well ahead, 
as it had been in 1869.  Close examination suggests that this should not be construed as a 
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British failure but as the direct and indirect result of American geography which underwrote 
scale economies and energy-intensive production together with a distinctive style of 
technological advance which was not appropriate for European countries (Crafts, 1998). 
Econometric evidence underlines the importance of bias towards raw-material use in 
technological change in American manufacturing together with the prevalence of scale 
economies (Cain and Paterson, 1986). 
The evidence on TFP growth is a bit more ambiguous than McCloskey (1970) believed. At 
the end of the nineteenth century, TFP growth accelerated in the United States which 
achieved a hitherto unprecedented rate (Table 3).  By the 1920s, American technological 
progress was underpinned by much larger investments in intangible and human capital 
formation (Abramovitz and David, 2001) and by 1929 the United States had established a 
clear TFP lead.  American TFP performance was not matched by Britain and to some extent 
this may reflect failings in education and technology policy.  McCloskey assumed that Britain 
could not have anticipated the American move to faster technological change, a prior which 
endogenous-growth economists might not share. 
In the early twentieth century, the British economy is always seen as one where 
competition generally prevailed in product markets.  Hannah stated: “It is a commonplace 
that in the course of the present century British industry has witnessed a transformation 
from a disaggregated structure of predominantly small competing firms to a concentrated 
structure dominated by large and often monopolistic corporations” (1983, p. 1) and he 
estimated the share of the largest 100 firms in manufacturing as only 15% of output (1983, 
p. 3). Magee described competition in the manufacturing sector as ‘generally intense’ (2004, 
p. 79) which echoes the assessment by Broadberry that “in most industries competitive 
forces acted as a spur to efficiency, with existing rivals or new entrants ready to take up 
opportunities neglected by incumbent producers” (1997c, p. 157). Profit rates seem to 
support these views; Davis and Huttenback (1986) found that owners’ rate of return on 
assets averaged 8.9% in the industrial and commercial sector from 1890 to 1913. 
The stance of supply-side policy might be regarded as quite ‘laissez-faire’; there was neither 
competition policy nor selective industrial policy.  Britain was an enthusiastic participant in 
globalization.  There were no restrictions on international capital mobility and British tariff 
policies were close to free trade; Lehmann and O’Rourke (2008) estimated that average 
tariffs on manufactures (measured by customs revenues/imports) were around 3% in the 
years just prior to World War I and on agricultural goods were about 1%.  Policy-made 
barriers to entry against foreign producers were therefore negligible. 
It is a staple of the literature that the only well-established failure to adopt cost-effective 
new technology, namely not to switch from the Leblanc to the Solvay process in soda 
manufacture, was in a cartelized activity and this is seen as underlining the point that 
competition was an antidote to entrepreneurial failure (Magee, 2004).  In the most-studied 
choice of technology, that between ring spinning and mule spinning in cotton textiles, the 
5 
 
evidence seems clear-cut that the British industry was rational to stick with mule spinning 
for the vast majority of its production (Leunig, 2001).  In addition, however, this industry can 
be seen as a case of something very close to perfect competition where policymakers 
allowed market forces to drive geographic concentration in Lancashire which delivered 
external economies of scale that underpinned a continuing productivity lead over American 
producers and an ability to compete on world markets against low-wage Asian suppliers 
(Leunig, 2003). 
Policies of openness served Britain well.  British investors gained significantly from foreign 
investment which allowed diversification of portfolios to permit considerably better risk-
return trade-offs (Chabot and Kurz, 2010; Goetmann and Ukhov, 2006). Econometric 
analysis of the relationship between exposure to trade and level of income indicates a 
strong positive effect in this era (Jacks, 2006); taking a conservative view of his results would 
suggest that a higher trade to income ratio was worth an income gain to Britain of at least 
10 per cent compared with Germany in 1913. 
Nevertheless, it might be argued on the lines set out by Richardson (1965) that Britain 
would have benefited from infant-industry policies designed to boost new, technologically 
progressive industries which were to some extent crowded out by the strength of Britain’s 
traditional export sectors.  This proposition seems unpersuasive, however, for a number of 
reasons.  First, this presumes capital market failures which are at the very least highly 
contentious (Michie, 1988). Second, it would have done nothing to help the services sector 
which in the long-term was the locus of American out-performance in productivity growth 
(Irwin, 2001).  Third, the political economy of tariff protection was such that the proposals 
that had the most political support such as those made by Chamberlain would have actually 
tended to divert activity towards traditional sectors such as agriculture and textiles rather 
than new growth industries (Thomas, 1984). Finally, if the real problem was market failures 
that implied too little investment in human capital and R & D, then the right response was 
policy interventions to address these failures directly. 
Although the new economic history has largely succeeded in rejecting claims of failure in the 
pre-1914 British economy, it is important to recognize that complete exoneration would be 
going too far.  For example, railways was a major sector whose performance was clearly 
inadequate – even Cain, a sympathetic observer, accepted that “there was waste and 
inefficiency in the railway system of Great Britain between 1870 and 1914” (1988, p. 120).  
Crafts et al. (2008) quantified the excess of actual over minimum feasible costs for a sample 
of 14 major railway companies and concluded that median cost inefficiency was 10.2% in 
1900, equivalent to about 1% of GDP. 
Two salient features of the railway sector were that competition was weak and so were 
shareholders in companies that were notable for the separation of ownership and control. 
By the early twentieth century, there were very high barriers to entry in an activity that was 
not internationally tradable and also significant attempts at collusion although, as outbursts 
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of expensive rivalry in terms of quality of passenger service illustrated, joint profit 
maximization was typically not achieved.  Major railway companies had large numbers of 
small shareholders and voting rules that ensured that boards of directors and professional 
managers were very securely entrenched (Hannah, 2007).  The key point is that this set-up 
implied that railway managers had considerable scope to pursue their own objectives and to 
fail to minimize costs at least while profits remained ‘acceptable’ (Cain, 1988).  In fact, after 
1900, profits became squeezed in the face of regulation of freight charges and rising costs 
and, as principal-agent models of the firm might predict, managers acted to improve 
operating efficiency (Irving, 1976);  median cost inefficiency in British railway companies fell 
to 2.6% by 1910 (Crafts et al., 2008). 
This example should not be taken as typical of the pre-1914 economy; on the contrary, 
railways were something of an outlier both in terms of barriers to entry and the degree of 
separation of ownership and control (Cheffins, 2008).  However, while railways were the 
exception in 1900, cases of weak competition together with weak shareholders would 
become all too common after 1950.  So, we may see railways as a harbinger of problems 
that would impair British economic performance in the decades of acute relative economic 
decline during the long post-war boom. 
4. The interwar period 
The interwar period was a difficult time for the British economy and its policymakers.  
Obviously, Britain was exposed to the macroeconomic shock of the Great Depression but 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s there were major adjustment problems arising from the 
difficulties of the Victorian export-staple industries; Britain was distinctly vulnerable to the 
globalization backlash.  The upshot in the 1930s was a major shift in British economic policy 
which entailed a substantial, and long-lasting, retreat from competition. 
Faced with world deflation, the coalition government pursued a ‘managed economy’ 
strategy to restore profitability by raising prices relative to wages (Booth, 1987).  This 
included leaving the gold standard in 1931, imposing a general tariff on manufacturing in 
1932, and, in the continuing absence of any anti-trust policy, increasingly encouraging 
cartels and collusive behaviour.  To address the politically embarrassing problems of 
declining industries in ‘outer Britain’, an embryonic industrial policy emerged which 
included not only tariff protection but also subsidies for economic activity in Special Areas 
and Acts to promote ‘rationalization’ under government-sanctioned cartels in coalmining 
(1930) and cotton (1939).  This was, of course, definitely not an ‘infant-industry’ approach to 
intervention; in fact, the largest increases in effective protection went to ‘old’ industries 
such as hosiery & lace and railway rolling stock (Kitson et al., 1991). 
As might be expected, the interwar economy exhibits symptoms of a considerable increase 
in market power.  By 1935, the share of the largest 100 firms in manufacturing output had 
risen to 23% following a merger boom in the 1920s; growing industrial concentration and 
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increased barriers to foreign entry greatly strengthened domestic cartels (Hannah, 1983).  
Mercer (1989) showed that by 1935 at least 29 per cent of manufacturing output was 
cartelized.  A proxy for the price-cost margin [(value-added – wages)/value added] 
calculated from the Census of Production shows an average increase of 3.8 percentage 
points across manufacturing sectors (from 0.563 to 0.601) from 1924 to 1935 while in the 
sectors identified by Mercer as cartelized the increase was 9.0 percentage points.  An 
econometric study by Henley (1988) found that the coal cartel raised the price-cost margin 
by 13.8 percentage points.  Hart (1968) estimated that the rate of return on capital 
employed for manufacturing companies had risen to 16.2% by 1937 from 11.4 % in 1924. 
The performance of the British economy in the 1930s, when there was an early and strong 
recovery from the depression, has sometimes been viewed quite favourably, especially by 
writers sympathetic to the view that Britain failed in the pre-1914 period.  For example, in a 
widely-used textbook, Pollard stated: “The view that, after a poor performance in the 1920s, 
the 1930s saw a genuine breakthrough, is indeed widespread and finds support not only in 
the output statistics but also in the quality of the modern investment and the structuring of 
British industry towards the growth-oriented sectors” (1983, p. 53).  This relatively 
optimistic interpretation has its roots in the thesis, originally argued by Richardson, of a 
regeneration of the economy through the productivity advance of ‘new’ industries and in 
the strong emphasis that Matthews et al. (1982) placed on the revival of TFP growth 
following a climacteric in the early twentieth century. 
These views appear be supported by the estimates in Tables 1 and 2 which show the gap 
with the United States narrowing  but the comparisons reported there are distorted by 
different rates of recovery from depression.  Indeed, a closer look suggests that 1930s’ 
British productivity performance was rather disappointing.  The most obvious point to make 
is that the growth rate of real GDP and TFP between 1929 and 1937 fell back from that of 
1924 to 1929 and was lower than in 1873 to 1899 (Crafts, 2004, Table 1.5).  Time series 
econometric analyses do not indicate a break in 1929 either in GDP or industrial production 
growth (Mills, 1991; Greasley and Oxley, 1996).  TFP growth remained well below the 
standard set by the United States during the first half of the twentieth century with R & D 
still only around 0.3 to 0.5 percent of GDP (Edgerton and Horrocks, 1994).  On an hours-
worked basis, the labour productivity gap between Britain and the United States in 
manufacturing continued to widen, as Table 4 reports. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that the retreat from competition in the 1930s was good for 
productivity performance; if anything, the opposite is the case.  Kitson and Solomou (1990) 
suggested that the interwar tariff had positive effects for manufacturing, at least in the 
short term, as activity revived.  They reported that labour productivity growth in industries 
that were newly-protected in 1932 showed an increase of 2.28 percentage points in 1930-5 
relative to 1924-30 compared with 0.03 percentage points in the non-newly protected 
industries.  This analysis can be refined by considering three-way split between industries 
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already protected through tariffs imposed in the 1920s (‘Early’), those receiving no 
protection or the basic nominal rate of 10 per cent in 1932 (and were not generally exposed 
to import competition), and those which were given enhanced protection at rates between 
20 and 33 percent (‘Additional’), based on the information given in Hutchinson (1965) and 
Sebag-Montefiore (1943). It is also instructive to consider a longer time period using the 
information on labour productivity in Brown (1964) such that the effects of insulation from 
competition on managerial incentives to control costs are more likely to show through. 
The regression results obtained for differences in labour productivity growth were as 
follows (t-statistics in parentheses): 
1930/35 – 1924/30  =  0.733  +  1.321 Additional  -  0.974 Early 
                                       (1.026)    (1.384)                     (-0.762) 
1935/48 – 1924/35  =  -1.228  +  0.109 Additional  -  1.843 Early 
                                       (-2.993)    (0.200)                     (-2.510) 
Granting additional protection in 1932 had a positive but insignificant effect on productivity 
growth in the short-run and a negligible impact in the longer run.  However, the difference 
in productivity growth for 1935/48 compared with 1924/35 is significantly negative and 
large for industries that had experienced a prolonged period of protection.  There is nothing 
in these results to suggest that protectionism was a supply-side policy that had long-run 
benefits for productivity performance. 
Broadberry and Crafts (1992) examined the impact of reduced competition on [productivity 
performance.  Controlling for other variables, they found a negative correlation between 
changes in the price-cost margin and productivity performance for a cross-section of British 
industries in the period 1924 to 1935 and that British industries which had a high 3-firm 
concentration ratio had lower labour productivity relative to the same industry in the United 
States in 1935/7.  They also presented a number of case studies which led them to conclude 
that cartelization, weak competition and barriers to entry had adverse implications for 
productivity outcomes.  It is also clear that government-sponsored restraint of competition 
in coal (Supple, 1987), cotton (Bamberg, 1988) and steel (Tolliday, 1987) were ineffective in 
promoting productivity improvement through rationalization although this was supposedly 
key policy objective. 
5.  The ‘golden age’ 
The period 1950 to 1973 is conventionally known as the ‘golden age’ of European economic 
growth.  This was an episode of rapid catch-up growth during which western European 
economies rapidly reduced the large productivity gap which the United States had 
established by 1950.  Abramovitz and David (1996) suggested European catch-up was based 
on enhanced ‘social capability’ (better incentive structures) and improved ‘technological 
congruence’ (American technology became more cost effective in European circumstances) 
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compared with the interwar period.  This meant there was a much greater opportunity for 
catch-up and European countries were better able to take advantage. 
During these years, Britain experienced its fastest-ever economic growth but at the same 
time relative economic decline proceeded at a rapid rate vis-a-vis its European peer group 
such that by the end of the period Britain had been overtaken by seven other countries in 
terms of real GDP per person and by nine others in terms of labour productivity.  UK growth 
was slower by at least 0.7 percentage points per year compared with any other country 
including those who started the period with similar of higher income levels (Table 5).  
Although slower growth can be partly explained by virtue of a higher initial level of income 
and productivity, being overtaken by France and West Germany is a clear indicator of 
avoidable failure.  This is confirmed by an unconditional growth regression for a cross-
section of regions within European countries in 1950-73 reported by Crafts and Toniolo 
(2010): 
GYP  =  5.292  -  0.029 Initial Level  +  0.920 Spain  +  1.046 West Germany  - 0.833 UK 
          (17.567)  (-7.521)                        (3.537)               (4.346)                           (-3.539) 
             +  0.716 Italy  +  0.169 France               R2 =  0.870 
               (3.017)             (0.766) 
where the omitted-country dummy variable is Netherlands.  This suggests that there was a 
growth failure of about 0.8 percentage points per year cumulating to an income shortfall of 
almost 20 per cent by 1973.1 
A major reason for slow labour productivity growth was weak TFP growth, as is clear from 
Table 3.  Maddison (1996) attempted a decomposition of the sources of TFP growth and he 
concluded that the shortfall in Britain could not be explained away by lower scope for catch-
up or the structure of the economy although clearly very rapid TFP growth in countries like 
West Germany did reflect reconstruction, reductions in the inefficient allocation of 
resources, and lower initial productivity (Temin, 2002).  The clear inference is that early-
Elizabethan Britain did fail and this is confirmed by France and West Germany overtaking 
the UK in productivity levels in the market sector by the 1970s, as is reported in Table 6. 
In the early postwar years, supply-side policy continued along the trajectory established in 
the 1930s.  Protectionist policies were sustained, competition policy was neglected, and 
there was recourse to industrial policy to support selected sectors.  In addition, 10 per cent 
of GDP was taken into public ownership which typically entailed a state monopoly.  This 
amounted to a policy stance which was conducive to weak competition in product markets. 
Table 7 underlines the slowness of the retreat from protectionist policies.  Average tariff 
rates for UK manufacturing remained at 1930s levels until the early 1960s and were 
                                                          
1
 This is large enough to be a real cause for concern but it is also fair to say that ‘decline’  is an ideological 
construct which has been associated with the politicization of economic policy (Tomlinson, 1996). 
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considerably higher than those in West Germany in the late 1950s.  Trade costs remained 
above the 1929 level until the 1970s when trade liberalization under the GATT and entry to 
the EEC drove them down; the contrast with countries which signed the treaty of Rome in 
1957 is apparent.  Industrial policies were skewed to protecting ailing industries both 
through subsidies (Wren, 1996), and tariffs (Greenaway and Milner, 1994).   
Competition policy was inaugurated with the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices 
Commission in 1948, evolved through the Restrictive Practices Act (1956) and the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1965), but was mostly ineffective (Clarke et al., 
1998).  Few investigations took place, very few mergers were prevented, the process was 
politicized, a variety of ‘public-interest’ defences for anti-competitive activities were 
allowed, and there were no penalties for bad behaviour.  Only the Restrictive Practices Act 
had teeth but its attack on collusion was ultimately undermined by cartels being superseded 
by mergers. 
Not surprisingly, there is evidence that the British economy was characterized by substantial 
market power in this period.  Initially, collusive activity was widespread; an examination of 
the agreements registered in compliance with the 1956 Act shows that only 27 per cent of 
manufacturing was free of price-fixing and 35.7 per cent was cartelized (Broadberry and 
Crafts, 2001).  Over time, industrial concentration increased steadily such that the average 
CR3 across manufacturing sectors was 41 per cent by 1968 compared with 26 per cent in 
1935 (Clarke, 1985) and the share of the 100 largest firms in manufacturing output reached 
40 per cent by 1970 (Hannah, 1983).  Crafts and Mills (2005) estimated that the price-cost 
margin in British manufacturing during 1954-73 averaged over 2 compared with around 1.1 
in West Germany which is consistent with the finding in Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) that 
the magnitude and persistence of supernormal profits for large firms during 1949 to 1977 
was large in the UK but that significant deviations from competitive outcomes were not 
observed in West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s.2  
The evidence on the rate of return on capital is a bit more difficult to interpret.  Hart (1968) 
reported that for the manufacturing sector this peaked at 18.4 per cent in 1951 but had 
fallen to 14.2 per cent 10 years later and 10.3 per cent by the late 1960s (Hill, 1979) after 
which the 1970s saw a ‘profits crisis’.  However, wage bargaining in Britain involved ‘rent-
sharing’ with workers extracting an increasing fraction of the rents as early postwar wage 
restraint was replaced by labour militancy and workers exploited their bargaining power. 
Workers may have been able to convert around 30 per cent of quasi-rents into a wage 
premium (van Reenen, 1996), in which case the rate of profit in the late 1960s may well 
have been similar to the later 1930s. 
                                                          
2
 The existence of significant market power in the UK but not in West Germany at this time is confirmed by the 
similarity of the primal and dual measures of TFP in the latter but not in the former; see Crafts and Mills (2005) 
for further elaboration. 
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The weakness of competition in product markets had potential implications for productivity 
performance through its interaction with institutions.  First, Britain entered the postwar 
period with an idiosyncratic and unreformed system of industrial relations characterized by 
craft control, multi-unionism, legal immunities for trade unions, and strong but 
decentralized collective bargaining reflected in increasing trade union density and the 
proliferation of shop stewards (Crouch, 1993).  These arrangements in conditions of full 
employment and weak competition gave trade unions bargaining power and rents to extract 
while exposing sunk-costs investment to ‘hold-up’ problems. 
Second, corporate governance in postwar Britain was notable for a strongly increasing 
tendency to the separation of ownership and control, where dominant ownership interests 
became much less common, which also made it a real outlier within Europe.  This reflected 
the demise of family control, the dilution of equity holdings through mergers, and a tax 
system which discouraged individual but favoured institutional investors (Cheffins, 2008).  
Given that the market for corporate control through takeovers did not work effectively as a 
constraint (Cosh et al., 2008), the weakness of competition allowed considerable scope for 
managerial underperformance. 
The evidence on lack of competition and British productivity performance during the Golden 
Age both shows an adverse effect and also that this worked at least partly through industrial 
relations and managerial failure.  Broadberry and Crafts (1996) found that cartelization was 
strongly negatively related to productivity growth in a cross section of manufacturing 
industries for 1954-63.  This result is borne out by the difference-in-differences analysis in 
Symeonidis (2008) who showed that when cartels were abandoned following the 1956 
Restrictive Practices Act labour productivity growth in formerly-colluding sectors rose by 1.8 
percentage points per year in 1964-73 compared with 1954-63.  This finding suggests that a 
more vigorous competition policy would have improved productivity performance. 
Case studies strongly implicate bad management and restrictive labour practices resulting 
from bargaining with unions in poor productivity outcomes.  Pratten and Atkinson (1976) 
reviewed 25 such studies and found either or both of these problems in 23 of them.  Prais 
(1981) reported similar findings in 8 out of 10 industry case studies and in each case noted 
that competition was significantly impaired.  He also pointed to the strong tendency for 
industrial-relations problems to lead British management to avoid large plants. 
Finally, econometric analysis found that in the 1970s and 1980s greater competition 
increased innovation (Blundell et al., 1999; Geroski, 1990) and raised productivity growth 
significantly in companies where there was no dominant external shareholder (Nickell et al., 
1997). In this (typical) case, increases in interest payments relative to cash flow also 
promoted faster productivity growth.  Both these results underline the role of weak 
competition in permitting agency-cost problems to undermine productivity performance 
and, at the same time, suggest that the considerable subsidies under the auspices of 
industrial policies were conducive to poor productivity outcomes.  
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6. From the 1970s to the early 21st Century 
After the golden age, European productivity growth slowed down markedly but less so in 
the UK than in most other countries.  Table 1 reported that British relative economic decline 
with respect to its large continental European rivals came to an end in this period.  By 2007, 
the UK had a slightly higher real GDP per person than either France or the former West 
Germany.  In considerable part, this reflected greater employment and longer hours worked 
as UK labour productivity was still lower than in the other two countries.  Nevertheless, by 
2007, relative productivity performance had recovered somewhat from the low point 
reached at the end of the 1970s, as Table 6 reports.  In fact, Table 6 significantly understates 
the extent of relative improvement in the UK since it does not allow for the implications of 
the labour-market distortions which underlie the differences in labour inputs.3   
As we shall see, looking at this post-golden-age episode is helpful as a test of the 
interpretation of the earlier period given above.  Insofar as relative TFP performance 
improved, this was largely through reductions in inefficiency in the use of factors of 
production in the UK and not through stronger R & D.  After the mid-1990s, capital per hour 
worked grew more quickly in the UK than in France and Germany.  Table 8 shows that this 
was a result of much stronger investment in ICT capital in the UK.  Both these aspects were 
responsive to increases in competition and product-market deregulation. 
Despite further nationalizations in the 1970s, after the golden age, government policy 
generally moved in the direction of increasing competition in product markets.  In particular, 
protectionism was discarded with liberalization through GATT negotiations, entry into the 
European Community in 1973, the retreat from industrial subsidies and foreign exchange 
controls in the Thatcher years, and the implementation of the European Single Market 
legislation in the 1990s.  The average effective rate of protection fell from 9.3% in 1968 to 
4.7% in 1979, and 1.2% in 1986 (Ennew et al., 1990), subsidies were reduced from £9bn (at 
1980 prices) in 1969 to £5bn In 1979 and £0.3bn in 1990 (Wren, 1996), and import 
penetration in manufacturing rose from 20.8% in 1970 to 40.8% by 2000 (Batchelor et al., 
1980; Criscuolo et al., 2004).  The process of trade liberalization reduced price-cost margins 
(Hitiris, 1978; Griffith, 2001). 
The 1980s and early 1990s were a period of de-regulation (notably of the financial sector) 
and privatization.  OECD measures of competition-inhibiting product market regulation 
(PMR) reported in Table 9 show the UK moving to a liberalized position and indeed by 1998 
it had the lowest PMR score among OECD countries.  Anti-trust policy was neglected during 
                                                          
3
 In 2007 the employment to working-age population ratio was 66.3% in UK, 65.9% in USA, 62.9% in Germany 
and 59.8% in France. In the lower employment countries, low-productivity workers were disproportionately 
excluded from employment by institutional arrangements.  There were also big differences in hours worked 
with the UK and USA much higher than France or Germany. Normalizing for these differences is difficult but 
would probably have a substantial impact, as the work of Bourles and Cette (2007) suggests.  Using their 
formula, the UK-France and the UK-Germany labour productivity gap in 2007 would be, respectively, about 6 
and 8 percentage points lower.  These discrepancies were tiny in the early 1970s. 
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those years but was notably strengthened by the Competition Act of 1998 and the 
Enterprise Act of 2003 which increased the independence of the competition authorities, 
removed the old ‘public-interest’ defence, and introduced criminal penalties for running 
cartels.  The index of competition policy reported in Table 9 show that British competition 
policy was still very weak by international standards in 1995 but much stronger ten years 
later. 
Not surprisingly, the evidence suggests that market power in the UK economy has fallen 
considerably since the 1970s.  The average 5-firm concentration ratio based on sales 
adjusted for imports was only 24 per cent in 1989 compared with 42 per cent in 1968 and 
30 per cent in 1980 (Clarke, 1993).  Two independent methods of estimating the price-cost 
margin in manufacturing both indicate that by 1995 it was about half the 1971 level (Crafts 
and Mills, 2011).  The downward trend in the mark-up from the 1970s onwards appears to 
have intensified further after the early 1990s (Macallan et al., 2008).  As Table 9 reports, by 
the late 1990s mark-ups in the UK economy as a whole were relatively low – in fact, OECD 
estimates suggest that mark-ups in services were the lowest in the OECD (Hoj et al., 2007).  
The rate of return on capital employed in manufacturing has recovered from the 1970s low 
and has averaged 10.2 per cent in the last 20 years. 
It is also clear that increased competition in the later twentieth century was associated with 
better productivity performance and that these effects worked at least partly through 
greater pressure on management to perform and through firm-worker bargains which 
raised effort and improved working practices.  Two papers considered the process of catch-
up growth.  Proudman and Redding (1998) found that across British industry during 1970-90 
openness raised the rate of productivity convergence with the technological leader and, in a 
study looking at catch-up across European industries, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) found 
that TFP growth was inversely related to PMR.  The implication of a lower PMR score as 
compared with France and Germany was a TFP growth advantage for the UK of about 0.5 
percentage points per year in the 1990s.  At the sectoral level, when concentration ratios 
fell in the UK in the 1980s, there was a strong positive impact on labour productivity growth 
(Haskel, 1991) and a difference-in-difference analysis showed that the removal of protection 
in the 1970s is associated with faster productivity growth in the early 1980s (Broadberry and 
Crafts, 2011). Entry and exit accounted for an increasing proportion of manufacturing 
productivity growth, rising from 25 per cent in 1980-5 to 40 per cent in 1995-2000 (Criscuolo 
et al., 2004). 
There is strong evidence that increases in competition had effects through reducing 
managerial failure. Increases in competition resulting from the European Single Market 
raised both the level and growth rate of TFP in plants which were part of multi-plant firms 
and thus most prone to agency problems (Griffith, 2001).  Nickell et al. (1997) found that a 
fall of supernormal profits from 15 to 5 per cent of value added raised TFP growth by 1 
percentage point in firms without a dominant external shareholder but had no significant 
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effect where there was such a shareholding.  Liberalization of capital market rules allowed 
more effective competition for corporate control and a notable feature of the period after 
1980 was divestment and restructuring in large firms and, in particular, management 
buyouts (often financed by private equity) which typically generated massive increases in 
TFP levels in the period 1988-98 (Harris et al., 2005). 
The 1980s and 1990s saw major changes in the conduct and structure of British industrial 
relations.  Trade union membership and bargaining power were seriously eroded (Gospel, 
2005). This was prompted partly by high unemployment and anti-union legislation in the 
1980s but also owed a good deal to increased competition (Brown et al., 2008).  The 1980s 
saw a surge in productivity growth in unionized firms as organizational change took place 
under pressure of competition (Machin and Wadhwani, 1989) and de-recognition of unions 
in the context of increases in foreign competition had a strong effect on productivity growth 
in the late 1980s (Gregg et al., 1993).  The negative impact of multi-unionism on TFP growth, 
apparent from the 1950s through the 1970s, evaporated after 1979 (Bean and Crafts, 1996). 
The UK has been more successful than most European countries in exploiting the 
opportunities of ICT and this has made a notable contribution to a relatively strong 
productivity performance in recent years (cf. Table 8).  The 1980s’ de-regulation of services 
that are intensive in the use of ICT (notably finance and retailing), which reduced barriers to 
entry, was important in this outcome as OECD cross-country comparisons reveal (Nicoletti 
and Scarpetta, 2005).4  It is also clear that investment in ICT is much more profitable and has 
a bigger productivity payoff if it is accompanied by organizational change in working and 
management practices (Crespi et al., 2007).  This would not have happened with 1970s-style 
industrial relations in conditions of weak competition.  For example, Prais (1981, pp. 198-
199) noted the egregious example of the newspaper industry where these conditions 
precluded the introduction of electronic equipment in Fleet Street although an investment 
of £50 million could have reduced costs by £35 million per year. 
7. Conclusions 
Applied economists in the UK are now generally agreed that strengthening competition in 
product markets is good for productivity performance.  This insight would be of no great 
surprise to the new economic historians of 40 years ago who examined the alleged failure of 
the late-Victorian economy but its implications have not been adequately explored in 
analyses of British economic growth during the twentieth century. 
Understanding the effects of changes in competition in the British economy is much easier 
with the long-run perspective developed in this paper.  This is partly because they work 
through interactions with institutions but also because hypotheses developed to interpret 
                                                          
4
 The sensitivity of productivity performance in retailing to regulation is underlined by the sharp reduction in 
TFP growth in this sector in the UK after the introduction of stricter limits on out-of-town supermarkets in 
1996 (Haskel and Sadun, 2009). 
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productivity performance in one period can be given an out-of-sample robustness check by 
looking at before and after.  Thus, the experience of the golden age can be used to support 
the new economic historians’ insistence on the importance of competition as a safeguard 
against failure in late Victorian Britain.  Likewise, an argument that weak competition was a 
fundamental problem in the 1950s and 1960s is made more powerful since it can be shown 
that when competition was strengthened in later decades there was a strong productivity 
response.   
Competition in the British economy was undermined in the 1930s and remained weak until 
the 1970s.  This was a period of relative economic decline which culminated in the 
overtaking of Britain by many other European countries.  The weakness of competition 
interacted with institutional legacies, namely, craft control on the shop floor and the 
separation of ownership and control in the boardroom, to underpin familiar aspects of 
diagnoses of the ‘British disease’ in terms of inadequate management and dysfunctional 
industrial relations.  Productivity performance was clearly impaired when competition was 
reduced from the 1930s and improved from the 1980s as a consequence of the return to 
stronger competition.  
Recognition of the central role of competition in shaping incentive structures which explain 
the waxing and waning of behaviours which play a major role in British relative economic 
performance allows a richer analysis (with clear policy implications) than is obtained by 
considering the various ‘problem components’ of the economy separately.  The full 
implications of the retreat from competition during and after the 1930s are only apparent 
when the framework of bargaining between firms and their workers together with the 
weakness of shareholders relative to managers are taken into account. 
Of course, competition, or the lack of it, is by no means the whole story with regard to 
British relative economic decline.  For example, education, taxation, macroeconomic policy 
are all deserving of attention.  Shortfalls in human and physical capital per hour worked, 
which reflect investment decisions made over the decades for many other reasons, played a 
major part.  This paper does not claim to offer a full account of economic performance but 
simply to provide a useful perspective. 
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Table 1.  Real GDP/head as percentage of other countries in each year 
 UK/USA UK/West Germany UK/France 
1870 130.5 173.5 170.0 
1913 92.8 134.9 141.2 
1929 79.8 135.8 116.8 
1937 96.7 132.7 138.6 
1950 72.6 162.1 133.8 
1979 70.1 86.3 90.0 
2007 75.4 101.4 106.1 
 
Note: estimates refer to Germany from 1870 to 1937. 
Sources: Angus Maddison historical database and West Germany in 2007 calculated from 
Statistiches Bundesamt Deutschland 2010. 
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Table 2. Comparative USA/UK and Germany/UK total factor productivity levels by sector, 
1871-1999 (UK = 100) 
 Agriculture Industry Services Whole Economy 
USA/UK     
1869/71 99.5 154.2 86.5 95.2 
1889/91 123.0 139.6 64.3 83.3 
1909/11 118.7 150.9 71.6 90.5 
1919/20 133.1 158.3 92.1 108.2 
1929 118.0 187.8 92.0 112.7 
1937 119.2 161.2 89.1 105.9 
1950 132.6 217.6 110.2 138.1 
Germany/UK     
1871 58.4 90.5 67.2 61.6 
1891 59.8 91.6 65.5 63.2 
1911 71.6 106.1 76.4 75.4 
1925 57.0 92.9 83.6 74.3 
1929 59.3 96.0 90.0 78.5 
1935 59.6 97.1 88.8 78.2 
1950 44.7 89.4 89.3 76.2 
 
Note: West Germany in 1950 
Sources: Broadberry (1997a, 1997b) 
  
27 
 
Table 3.  Whole Economy TFP Growth, 1890-1973 (% per year) 
 Germany UK USA 
1891-1929 0.9 0.3 1.0 
1929-50 N/A 0.6 1.5 
1950-73 2.7 1.3 1.5 
 
Note:  West Germany in 1950-73.  Labour inputs are measured in persons, education 
subsumed in TFP. 
Sources:  worksheets underlying sources for Table 2. 
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Table 4.  Real output/hour worked in manufacturing. 
 UK growth 
(% per year) 
US growth 
(% per year) 
 US/UK 
(UK = 100) 
   1870 195.2 
1870-90 1.58 1.75 1890 201.9 
1890-1913 1.33 2.11 1913 241.2 
1913-29 2.46 3.05 1929 264.5 
1929-37 2.90 3.35 1937 274.0 
 
Source: de Jong and Woltjer (2009); data kindly supplied by Herman de Jong. 
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Table 5.  Levels and rates of growth of real GDP/head, 1950-73. 
 Y/P, 1950 ($1990GK) Y/P, 1973 ($1990GK) Growth of Y/P, 
1950-73 (% per year) 
Switzerland 9064 18204 3.08 
Denmark 6943 13945 3.08 
UK 6939 12025 2.42 
Sweden 6739 13494 3.06 
Netherlands 5971 13081 3.45 
Belgium 5462 12170 3.54 
Norway 5430 11324 3.24 
France 5186 12824 4.02 
West Germany 4281 13153 5.02 
Finland 4253 11085 4.25 
Austria 3706 11235 4.94 
Italy 3502 10634 4.95 
Ireland 3453   6867 3.03 
Spain 2189   7661 5.60 
Portugal 2086   7063 5.45 
Greece 1915   7655 6.21 
 
Source: The Conference Board (2010) 
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Table 6.  Levels of productivity in the market sector (UK = 100) 
 France West Germany 
/Germany 
USA 
Y/HW    
1973   95 132 160 
1979 112 157 166 
1991 123 161/143 156 
1995 117 133 146 
2007 109 119 147 
TFP    
1973   87 112 127 
1979 103 135 135 
1991 110 133/123 128 
1995 104 115 123 
2007 101 110 125 
 
Notes: 
Estimates in 1973 and 1979 are West Germany; in 1991 West Germany is the first number, 
in 1995 and 2007 estimates are for unified Germany.  
Sources: estimates kindly provided by Mary O’Mahony based on EUKLEMS data as described 
in O’Mahony and Timmer (2009) and on earlier data underlying O’Mahony (1999) and 
O’Mahony and van Ark (2003).
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1 
Table 7.  Indicators of protectionism. 
a) Average tariff rates on UK manufactures (%) 
1932 13.2 
1935 14.7 
1960 14.5 
1963 12.8 
1968 11.2 
 
b) Tariff rates for UK and West German manufacturing (%) 
 UK West Germany 
Chemicals 15   8 
Leather 16 12 
Rubber 21 10 
Wood 15   7 
Paper 13   8 
Textiles 23 11 
Non-Metallic Minerals 17   6 
Iron & Steel 14   7 
Non-Electrical Machinery 17   5 
Electrical Machinery 23   6 
Transport Equipment 25 12 
Clothing 26 13 
Instruments 27   8 
 
c) Trade Costs Index 
 UK-France UK-Germany France-Germany Germany-Italy 
1929 100   99   99 110 
1938 121 122 133 112 
1950 122 142 112 127 
1960 122 115   91 101 
1970 110 105   73   79 
1980   74   66   55   61 
1990   70   61   53   56 
2000   75   66   61   66 
 
Note: trade costs include all barriers to trade (policy and non-policy) and are derived from 
estimation of a gravity equation. 
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Sources: 
Part a): Kitson and Solomou (1990); Morgan and Martin (1975); Part b): Political and 
Economic Planning (1962); Part c): data underlying Jacks et al. (2009) kindly provided by 
Dennis Novy. 
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Table 8.  Sources of labour productivity growth in the market sector, 1995-2005 (% per 
year) 
 Labour 
Quality 
ICTK/HW Non-ICT 
K/HW 
TFP Labour 
Productivity 
Growth 
France 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.9 2.1 
Germany 0.1 0.5 0.6 0.4 1.6 
UK 0.5 0.9 0.4 0.8 2.6 
USA 0.3 1.0 0.3 1.3 2.9 
 
Source: Timmer et al. (2010)  
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Table 9.  Product market regulation, competition policy, and price-cost margins 
a) PMR 
 1975 1990 1998a 1998b 2003 2008 
France 6.0 5.2 4.3 2.52 1.75 1.45 
Germany 5.2 4.6 2.8 2.06 1.60 1.33 
UK 4.8 3.0 1.4 1.07 0.82 0.84 
USA 3.7 2.3 1.6 1.28 1.01 0.84 
 
b) CPI 
 1995 2005 
France 0.45 0.52 
Germany 0.49 0.52 
UK 0.30 0.60 
USA 0.59 0.62 
 
c) Price-Cost Margin, late 1990s 
 Manfs. Services 
France 1.12 1.26 
Germany 1.13 1.25 
UK 1.11 1.16 
USA 1.12 1.19 
 
Sources: 
PMR is a measure of how far regulation impedes product market competition on a scale of 
0-6 from Conway and Nicoletti (2006) and Wolfl et al. (2009); the first three and the last 
three columns are measured on a different basis. 
CPI is an index of competition policy taking into account independence of the competition 
authorities, deterrence and enforcement from Buccirossi et al. (2009). 
Price-cost margin from Hoj et al. (2007). 
